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INTRODUCTION

The European Union (“EU”), among other polities, has illuminated
the ways in which hegemonic digital platforms like Amazon, Facebook,
Google, and Uber have disrupted the way the public understands
competition, democracy, information, and data privacy. 1 As detailed in a
recent EU Commission report, the market power enjoyed by these and
other digital monopolies entails not only risks to competition but also to
consumer well-being itself. 2 Tribunals from diverse countries such as
Australia, 3 the U.S., 4 and the UK 5 reached similar conclusions. In fact,
multiple court rulings and public investigations have established that the
data of 85 million Facebook users were traded, exposed, and commodified
for political purpose in violation, not only of Facebook’s own terms and
conditions, but of various national and international laws and treaties. 6 Such
data exploitation threatens the privacy of users. And although these privacy
concerns are serious, they are not the only threat.
Competition is at risk: indeed, it has yet to be studied to what extent
the more than two hundred Google acquisitions during its short lifetime will
compromise innovation, competition, and consumer well-being. Despite
the undoubtedly useful technologies these companies have produced, the
digital leviathans monopolizing the cyber ecosystem have revealed
themselves as the “bad guys,” as established in judicial rulings at every legal
level, within and outside the EU 7 Ursula von der Leyen, President of the
European Commission, warned before being elected that “it may be too late
See Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 3: The Role of Data and Privacy in
Competition, Hearing on H. Res. 965 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial, and
Admin. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Margrethe
1

Vestager, Executive Vice President, European Comm’n).

Commission Report: Competition Policy for the Digital Era, at 73, COM (2019),
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/21dc175c-7b76-11e9-9f0501aa75ed71a1/language-en [https://perma.cc/XB9J-56R2] [hereinafter Commission
Report].
Cambridge Analytica: Australia Takes Facebook to Court Over Privacy, BBC (Mar. 9,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51799738 [https://perma.cc/C68W-V7NK].
Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019).
See generally, DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT COMM., DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE
NEWS’:
FINAL
REPORT,
2017–19,
HC
1791
(UK),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9S6-KVN7] [hereinafter House of Commons].
2

3

4
5

Id.
See Laureen Snider, Enabling Exploitation: Law in the Gig Economy, in CRITICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 26(4), 563 (2018); see also SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
6
7

CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR
(2019).

A

HUMAN FUTURE
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to replicate hyperscalers, but it is not too late to achieve technological
sovereignty in some critical technology areas.” 8 Others are also concerned
about the overwhelming power of technology companies. Shortly after the
European Commission presented its European data strategy with the
undisguised intention of counteracting Silicon Valley’s and China’s data
power, the United States Congress subpoenaed the top tech corporations to
understand “the degree to which these intermediaries enjoy market power,
how they are using that market power, whether they are using their market
power in ways that have harmed consumers and competition, and how
Congress should respond.” 9 Digital capitalists have lied, 10 evaded taxes, 11
stolen data, 12 abused their dominant position, 13 and knowingly caused social
damage by defending their position (and the benefits of their shareholders)
against the collective interests of citizens all around the world. 14
Why are criminal corporations permitted to get away with lying, tax
evasion, data theft, abuse of market position, and other forms of social
harm? Why, despite all the institutional big words, has so little been done
in terms of regulatory developments or more effective enforcement? And
why, despite the growing academic scholarship on the social harm wrought
by digital corporations, do we still lack a comprehensive criminological
theory that explains the rationale behind them? There are chiefly two sets
of reasons: academic and political.
Academically, this highlights one of the main deficiencies of legal
studies (particularly those related to criminal law): there is a myopic
Ursula Von Der Leyen, A Union That Strives for More: My Agenda for Europe: Political
for the Next European Commission 2019–2024, at 13 (2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T7J9-XY87].
Press Release, Congressman David Cicilline, House Antitrust Subcommittee Issues
Document Requests as Part of Digital Markets Investigation (Sep. 13, 2019),
https://cicilline.house.gov/press-release/house-antitrust-subcommittee-issues-documentrequests-part-digital-markets [https://perma.cc/S7YA-DJQV].
Alexandra S. Levine, Did Zuckerberg Lie Under Oath?, POLITICO (Aug. 16, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-tech/2019/08/16/did-zuckerberg-lie-underoath-718817 [https://perma.cc/79UQ-A8Q4].
Rita Barrera & Jessica Bustamante, The Rotten Apple: Tax Avoidance in Ireland, 1 INT’L
TRADE J. 32, 150 (2018).
See generally Donell Holloway, Surveillance Capitalism and Children’s Data: The Internet
of Toys and Things for Children, 170 MEDIA INT’L AUSTRALIA 27, 28 (2019).
Case No. T-612/17, Google & Alphabet v. Comm’n (Google Shopping),
ECLI:EU:T:2021:763 (Nov. 10, 2021).
Georgia Wells, Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Knows Instagram Is Toxic
for Teen Girls, Company Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girls-companydocuments-show-11631620739?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/P35K-YZHW].
8

Guidelines

9

10

11
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14
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emphasis on isolated problematic and individual perpetrators, causing a
lack of meaningful structural analysis of the legal system and society as a
whole. In contrast, research into the socio-economic factors behind crime
are robust as evidenced by the wealth of scholarship. The best evidence of
this fact is the wealth of scholarship drawn from around the globe. 15
However, and despite several remarkable works—some of them further
analyzed here—theories of crime and deviance that target not just the socioeconomic conditions of certain groups but the system of production,
remain, at best, marginalized. The lack of critical structural analysis within
legal studies affects not only criminal law and criminology but also every
legal and political field. To illustrate, since the 1924 publication of Law and
Marxism: A General Theory, 16 no other significant book outlining a general
legal theory questioning the liberal legal dogma has been published in
Western countries. The lack of structural critique to the foundations of legal
liberalism has helped naturalize capitalism as the only conceivable system.
Of course, this does not mean that the liberal hegemony has not been
challenged and disputed. It has. For instance, decolonial authors such as
Boaventura de Sousa Santos have defended a pluralistic legal approach,
targeting the colonial and Eurocentric core of liberal legal theories. 17 In the
same vein, Indigenous scholars such as Glen Coulthard and Moana Jackson
have defended the decolonization of the settler-colonial states such as
Canada and New Zealand. 18 For instance, Moana Jackson, in a brilliant
critique of New Zealand’s heavily racialized criminal justice system,
defended the coexistence of Westernized law along with Indigenous legal
knowledge and practices. 19 Also, Latin American political and legal theorists
such as Alvaro García Linera and Carlos Wolkmer outlined, and eventually
succeeded in proposing, pluralistic constitutional frameworks consistent
Biko Agozino, The General Theory of Crimes of The Powerful, in REVISITING CRIMES OF
THE POWERFUL: MARXISM, CRIME AND DEVIANCE 297–308 (Steven Bittle, Lauren Snider,
Steve Tombs & David White, eds., 2018); Ignasi Bernat & David Whyte, State‐Corporate
Crimes, in THE HANDBOOK OF WHITE‐COLLAR CRIME 127–38 (Melissa L. Rorie ed.,
2019).
See generally EVGENY PASHUKANIS, LAW & MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY (Chris Arthur
ed., Barbara Einhorn trans., Pluto Publishing Limited 1989).
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 92 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 2002).
GLENN SEAN COULTHARD, RED SKIN, WHITE MASKS: REJECTING THE COLONIAL
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Robert Warrior ed., University of Minnesota Press 2014);
MOANA JACKSON, THE MAORI AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A NEW PERSPECTIVE:
HE WHAIPAANGA HOU (U.S. Dep’t of Just. Nat’l Inst. of Just. 1987).
Moana Jackson, Justice and Political Power: Reasserting Maori Legal Processes, in LEGAL
PLURALISM AND THE COLONIAL LEGACY 243–56 (Kayleen M. Hazlehurst ed., Ashgate
Publishing 1995).
15

16

17

18

19
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with Indigenous and progressive values. 20 However, as promising as these
are, such examples of critical legal thinking from the Global South have
limited influence over critical legal scholars in the Global North.
Institutions and public servants suffer from a similar trouble, although
with different ramifications. Authorities’ legal response to the acts of
criminal corporations—from the gentrification processes unleashed by
Airbnb, 21 to the violation of labor laws in the case of Amazon or Uber 22—
arrive too late, and without offering solutions to the multiple problems.
There are two principal explanations for this. The first is technical,
specifically with the rapid pace of the digital transformation. 23 In an
unprecedentedly short period of time, digital technologies, from mobile
messaging to agriculture or finance, have become omnipresent in people’s
everyday lives, and that applies to both the Global North and the Global
South. 24 The second is political; the acceleration of technology has outpaced
and outmaneuvered liberal democracy’s archaic legislative processes.
Neither the Global South nor the Global North have adequately funded or
implemented the digitalization of its bureaucracies and provision of services.
As recently demonstrated during the COVID-19 crisis, this has prevented
the public sector from adequately reflecting broader social and economic
transformation: 25 a new reality in which the digital sphere is not just a part of
everyday life, but in many instances, operates as its basic infrastructure. 26
Álvaro García Linera, Las Tensiones Creativas de la Revolución: La Quinta Fase del
Proceso de Cambio, VICEPRESIDENCIA DEL ESTADO PRESIDENCIA DE LAW ASAMBLEA
20

LEGILSATIVA PLURNACIONAL, BOLIVIA (2011), https://www.bivica.org/files/tensionescreativas.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGN4-FJAL]. See generally ANTONIO CARLOS WOLKMER,
PLURALISMO JURÍDICO-FUNDAMENTOS DE UMA NOVA CULTURA DO DIREITO (Saraiva
Educação SA ed., 2017).
IAN BROSSAT, AIRBNB, LA VILLE UBERISEE 160 (2018).
Aitor Jiménez González, Law, Code and Exploitation: How Corporations Regulate the
Working Conditions of the Digital Proletariat¸ 48 CRITICAL SOCIO. 361, 366–67.
Andy Becket, Accelerationism: How a Fringe Philosophy Predicted the Future We Live
In,
GUARDIAN
(May
11,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/11/accelerationism-how-a-fringe-philosophypredicted-the-future-we-live-in [https://perma.cc/8TNE-J7XS].
NICK COULDRY & ULISES A. MEJIAS, THE COSTS OF CONNECTION: HOW DATA IS
COLONIZING HUMAN LIFE AND APPROPRIATING IT FOR CAPITALISM 83–112 (2019).
Linda Hantrais, Paul Allin, Mihalis Kritikos, Melita Sogomonjan, Prathivadi B. Anand,
Sonia Livingstone, Mark Williams & Martin Innes, Covid-19 and the Digital Revolution, 16
CONTEMP. SOC. SCI. 256–70 (2021); Brett Milano, Big Tech’s Power Growing at Runaway
Speed,
HARV.
GAZETTE
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/02/government-cant-keep-up-with-technologysgrowth/ [https://perma.cc/3PL4-GDGE].
Geoff Mulgan, Anticipatory Regulation: 10 Ways Governments Can Better Keep Up with
21
22

23

24

25

26
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Large digital corporations, meanwhile, have not wasted the opportunity.
Making extensive use of the “silicon doctrine,” 27 they have taken advantage
of loopholes in areas ranging from privacy to labor, education, and even
housing. 28 As this Article will further analyze, where there were laws, these
same corporations have not hesitated to violate legislation to realize a new
status quo.
Another fundamental set of motives that prevented clear action on the
part of authorities, related to ideological reasons, involves the nature of law
in the bourgeois state. Law— understood as the set of legal relations that
articulate the social life of a territory—is not exempt from ideological burden.
It is no secret that liberalism and the market economy are fundamental
pillars of Global North’s hegemonic liberal constitutionalism. 29 Following
Pēteris Stučka, it could be said that the law is not only not neutral but serves
as an instrument to guarantee private ownership of the means of production;
facilitating the circulation of capital and its accumulation by the ruling classes
while assuring a social formation firmly grounded in the exploitation of the
working class. 30 The capitalist class amassed power not only by reifying
through law the control of labor, exploitation, and private property, but also
by legitimizing crimes (or criminalizing behaviors) depending upon class
interests. As Evgeny Pashukanis said, “Criminal justice in the bourgeois state
is organized class terror, which differs only in degree from the so-called
emergency measures taken in civil war.” 31 That is, criminal law operates as
a political instrument, just like civil, commercial, or constitutional law. 32
This Article aims to analyze the structural relation of capitalism and
corporate crime in the context of the digital economy—in other words, the
criminal strategy in which the silicon doctrine operates. Drawing upon
Fast-Changing
Industries,
NESTA
(May
15,
2017),
https://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/anticipatory-regulation-10-ways-governments-can-better-keepup-with-fast-changing-industries/ [https://perma.cc/HBK5-2RBV].
Aitor Jiménez, The Silicon Doctrine, 18 TRIPLEC: COMMUNICATION, CAPITALISM &
CRITIQUE 322, 323–24 (2020).
See generally Julie Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133
(2017).
See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); ROBERTO GARGARELLA, LATIN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1810–2010: THE ENGINE ROOM OF THE CONSTITUTION
(2013).
See PĒTERIS STUČKA, SELECTED WRITINGS ON SOVIET LAW AND MARXISM 59–165
(Robert Sharlet ed., Peter B. Maggs trans., Routledge 1988).
PASHUKANIS, supra note 16, at 173.
Grietje Baars, Capital, Corporate Citizenship and Legitimacy: The Ideological Force of
“Corporate Crime” in International Law, in THE CORPORATION: A CRITICAL, MULTIDISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK 419–33 (Grietje Baars & André Spicer eds., 2017).
27

28

29

30

31
32
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critical criminology, the following question shall be examined: Why do
harmful corporate antisocial behaviors so often evade the punitive reach of
the state?
Part I examines corporate harm and social harm. Part II outlines a
theoretical framework with which to analyze the crimes of digital capitalism
related to data and competition, here termed “data crimes.” Section II.A
explains the grounds where digital capitalism’s monopolistic structure stands
by looking at the historical background of contemporary antitrust laws.
Section II.B draws upon the neoliberal rule of law to explain the
relationship between corporate power and data crimes, and Section II.C
details data crimes and explains why they are not cybercrimes. Part III
examines Facebook’s data crimes, focusing on Facebook and privacy
violations in Section III.A and on Facebook and anticompetition violations
in Section III.B. Part IV discusses the ways in which public institutions are
dealing with the violation of privacy and competition laws. Finally, Part V,
analyzes the question of digital corporate criminal liability, concluding that
the nature of the corporation—intrinsically criminal, intrinsically
imperialist—makes it difficult to deter criminal misconduct within big tech
through traditional criminal means. New approaches must be sought.
II.

CORPORATE HARM AND SOCIAL HARM

In a now-distant 1949, Edwin Sutherland wrote White Collar Crime, 33
a trailblazing work that revolutionized modern criminology by shifting the
object of study, from (mostly) underclass individuals, to upper-class
individuals and to corporations themselves. In an earlier work, Sutherland
stated the importance of building an adequate framework to understand
violations of the criminal code that do end with a criminal conviction:
White-collar crime is real crime. It is not ordinarily called crime,
and calling it by this name does not make it worse, just as
refraining from calling it crime does not make it better than it
otherwise would be. It is called crime here in order to bring it
within the scope of criminology, which is justified because it is in
violation of the criminal law. The crucial question in this analysis
is the criterion of violation of the criminal law. Conviction in the
criminal court, which is sometimes suggested as the criterion, is
not adequate because a large proportion of those who commit

See generally EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949) (developing the
concept of white-collar criminality).
33
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crimes are not convicted in criminal courts. This criterion,
therefore, needs to be supplemented. 34
Sutherland revealed how widespread corporate crime was among
respectable corporations, and how rarely their criminal behavior was
criminalized, prosecuted, or punished. 35 Sutherland considered white-collar
crime as inherent and functional to the American capitalist social formation.
Sutherland explained that these criminal behaviors were not as firmly
prosecuted as other crimes, despite being harmful to society, because of
class solidarity between bourgeoisies. These wealthy individuals were more
capable of understanding the criminal behavior of their peers, to avoid
prosecution, and—eventually—to perpetrate the same kind of crimes. But as
many have highlighted, the main lesson to extract from Sutherland’s work
is that crime is not limited to those criminal offenses figuring in the criminal
code, but also includes those crimes of the powerful hidden under civil and
administrative regulations. 36 This sociological explanation was a turning
point from other works of criminology that, at the time, were trying to
explain crime as a result of psychological, cultural, anthropological, or even
biological traits, making its contemporaries re-evaluate the role crime,
upper-classes, and institutions played in developing social structures.
It is worth analyzing the work of Frank Pearce, arguably one of the
most influential contemporary Marxist criminologists. In 1976, Frank
Pearce published what would become a contemporary classic: Crimes of
the Powerful. 37 This work picked up on Sutherland’s scholarship,
complementing it with its critical Marxist perspective. As Pearce later
explained, 38 white collar crimes were not only functional and beneficial to
the upper classes as a human group, but also as a socio-political class. Unlike
Sutherland, Pearce did not think that white-collar crimes were treated more
leniently by the state because of the shared cultural mindset of the upper
class, but as the product of a deliberate political strategy intended to
reinforce bourgeois class domination. 39 Thus, for Pearce, criminal law in
Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1, 5 (1940).
Edwin H. Sutherland, Is “White Collar Crime” Crime?, 10 AM. SOCIO. REV. 132, 136
(1945).
EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 6–7 (1983).
FRANK PEARCE, CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL: MARXISM, CRIME AND DEVIANCE 143–56
(1976) [hereinafter CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL].
Frank Pearce, Organized Crime and Class Politics, in CRIME AND CAPITALISM: READINGS
IN MARXIST CRIMINOLOGY 157–81 (David Greenberg ed., 1981).
See FRANK PEARCE, MARXISM AND CORPORATE CRIME IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2015)
(arguing that crime is a strategic mechanism to ensure class division) [hereinafter CORPORATE
CRIME].
34
35

36
37

38

39
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liberal states was an ideological instrument designed to reinforce class
oppression. 40 This was evidenced by the fact that flagrant and frequent
corporate criminal behaviors were not criminalized, falling outside the
punitive scope of the state, while a tough-on-crime approach was adopted in
cases of the often-petty crimes committed by working-class individuals,
triggering the era of mass incarceration. Pierce was an avid reader of the
Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. In an influential work, Althusser
analyzed the Ideological State Apparatuses, which he defined as the
concrete form of the capitalist ideology:
An Ideological State Apparatus is a system of defined institutions,
organizations, and the corresponding, practices. Realized in the
institutions, organizations, and practices of this system is all or
part (generally speaking, a typical combination of certain
elements) of the State Ideology. The ideology realized in an ISA
ensures its systemic unity on the basis of an ‘anchoring’ in
material Junctions specific to each ISA; these functions are not
reducible to that ideology, but serve it as a ‘support.’ 41
For Althusser, “All Ideological State Apparatuses, of any kind,
contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of
production.” 42 However, Althusser specifically underscored the importance
of the Legal Ideological State Apparatuses, stating that “the law is the
Ideological State Apparatus whose specific dominant function is, not to
ensure the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, which it also
helps ensure (in, however, subordinate fashion), but directly to ensure the
functioning of capitalist relations of production.” 43 Therefore, for Pearce,
and his contemporaries, the act of regulating and criminalizing behaviors
was a political one, rather than a technical one, revelatory of the ideology
underpinning the capitalist social formation. 44 While Sutherland privileged
the analysis of offenders’ criminogenic behaviors to understand and explain
the criminal nature of white-collar crimes, Pearce highlighted the important
role the state plays in shaping and defining criminal policies. 45 Pearce
focused his attention on the social structures in which legal relations are
40

See id.

LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ON THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM: IDEOLOGY AND
IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 77 (G.M. Goshgarian trans. 2014).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 160.
Herman Schwendinger & Julia Schwendinger, Social Class and the Definition of Crime, 7
CRIME & SOC. JUST. 4, 9 (1977).
CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 39, at 7.
41

42
43
44

45
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built. That is why Pearce identified the crimes of the powerful as a set of
behaviors solidly inserted in the mechanics of the capitalist political
economy, within which the state operates. 46 Thus, Pearce explained that the
bourgeois criminal law responds to the interests of the ruling class, as a
socio-economic class, and not merely as a de facto human group. 47
Pearce’s work was extraordinarily relevant and continues to be so.
Drawing upon Pearce, Paddy Hillyard and Steve Tombs proposed a move
from the notion of crime to one of social harm. 48 For them (and for many
Marxist scholars), crime has “no ontological reality.” 49 That is, crime does
not exist as a natural phenomenon; instead, it is socially constructed.
Hillyard and Tombs demonstrated that the capitalist social construction of
crime, while consisting of many petty events, “excludes many serious
harms,” 50 for instance, environmental pollution caused by industry. For
them, the Legal Ideological State Apparatuses, which include criminal law,
legitimize what capitalists consider crime control, while willfully overlooking
other harmful behaviors, thereby selectively constructing crime within a web
of “a myriad of other power relations.” 51
Among those who followed Pearce’s contributions is Gregg Barak,
editor of The Routledge International Handbook of the Crimes of the
Powerful, 52 which reframed Pierce’s work in the globalized twenty-first
century. Crime, rather than being an obstacle to capitalist globalization,
makes it possible. In the same vein, Dawn Rothe and David O. Friedrichs
published Crimes of Globalization, 53 providing a description and analysis of
crimes committed by corporations on a global scale, resulting in deaths,
murders, environmental destruction, labor exploitation, and even state
bankruptcy. 54 These crimes are only possible in a neoliberal globalized
context. In a time where the pernicious consequences of climate change are
becoming more and more perceptible, 55 both for the general public and
governing institutions, there is an increasing demand not only for further
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
See generally Paddy Hillyard & Steve Tombs, From ‘Crime’ to Social Harm?, 48 CRIME,

L. & SOC. CHANGE 9 (2007).
49
50
51

Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 15.
See generally THE ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK

OF THE CRIMES OF THE
POWERFUL (Gregg Barak ed. 2015) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
See generally DAWN L. ROTHE & DAVID O. FRIEDRICHS, CRIMES OF GLOBALIZATION
(Walter S. DeKeseredy ed. 2014).
Id. at 51.
J.C. Oleson, “Drown the World”: Imperfect Necessity and Total Cultural Revolution, 3
UNBOUND: HARVARD J. OF THE LEGAL LEFT 19, 32 (2007).
52

53

54
55

980

2022]

THE CRIMES OF DIGITAL CAPITALISM

981

corporate social responsibility, but also for their legal and criminal liability
for environmental crimes. As a result, a proliferation of analyses focused on
environmental crimes have emerged, demonstrating how the bourgeois law,
while protecting the assets of the ruling class, allows the appropriation of the
commons and the destruction of the environment. 56
In 2018, Steven Bittle, Laureen Snider, Steve Tombs, and David
Whyte edited Revisiting Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, Crime and
Deviance. 57 The contributions of this important book highlight the intimate
relationships between corporations, crime, and the capitalist social
formation. The authors revisit Pierce’s classic, 58 fully engaging in a Marxist
theoretical debate around crime, ideology, and the political economy of
criminalization. A significant share of the contribution looks at the ‘crimes
of globalization’ from diverse, but complementary perspectives. For
instance, Ignasi Bernat analyzed the 2008 Spanish economic crisis,
regarding it as a crime committed by rentier capitalists. 59 Gregg Barak
scrutinized global capital, 60 while Biko Agozino offered a “General Theory
of Crimes of the Powerful” through his study of imperialism. 61 In sum, the
collective work establishes a dialogue with Pearce, not only as criminologists
looking at corporate crime, but also as Marxists.
Along the same Marxist criminology line, Grietje Baars and Harry
Glasbeek have taken a historical approach to analyze the intimate
relationship between capitalism and the legal form. 62 Baars details how the
capitalist class has used law to gain and reinforce its power. 63 Departing from
a Marxist theoretical discussion that closely follows Pashukanis’ thinking, 64
Baars identifies law as an intrinsic element of the capitalist social formation.

Michael Lynch, Green Criminology and Environmental Crime: Criminology that Matters
in the Age of Global Ecological Collapse, 1 J. WHITE COLLAR & CORP. CRIME 50, 54 (2020).
See STEVEN BITTLE, LAUREN SNIDER, STEVE TOMBS & DAVID WHITE, EDS., REVISITING
56

57

CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL: MARXISM, CRIME AND DEVIANCE (2018).
See PEARCE, CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL, supra note 37.
Ignasi Bernat, The Crimes of the Powerful and the Spanish Crisis, in REVISITING CRIMES
OF THE POWERFUL: MARXISM, CRIME AND DEVIANCE 217–30 (Steven Bittle et al., eds.,
2018).
Gregg Barak, Global Capital, The Rigging of Interbank Interest Rates and the Capitalist
State, in REVISITING CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL: MARXISM, CRIME AND DEVIANCE 143–56
(Steven Bittle et al., eds., 2018).
Biko Agozino, The General Theory of Crimes of The Powerful, in REVISITING CRIMES OF
THE POWERFUL: MARXISM, CRIME AND DEVIANCE 297–308 (Steven Bittle et al., eds., 2018).
See generally GRIETJE BAARS, THE CORPORATION, LAW AND CAPITALISM: A RADICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2019).
58
59
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Id.
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PASHUKANIS, supra note 16, at 173.
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Other authors believe that law has emancipatory potential, 65 but Baars, on
the contrary (following Pashukanis), concludes that the law is unrecoverable:
“In conclusion, I argue that while emancipation from corporate power
cannot be achieved through law, its promise lies in the alternatives (such as
counter-systemic activism, building alternative modes of production,
abolitionist and transformative justice work) and, with that, human
emancipation.” 66
Glasbeek focuses upon how capitalist legal infrastructure shields
corporations, rendering the capitalist class unaccountable for its crimes. 67
For Glasbeek, corporate impunity is the logical consequence of the
neoliberal dogma, as this doctrine implies private accumulation of socially
produced wealth. 68 In a similar vein, Steve Tombs and David Whyte point
out the interdependence between the modern state and corporations.
“Corporations are institutions that are created for the mobilization,
utilization and protection of capital. As such, they are wholly artificial
entities whose very existence is provided for, and maintained through, states’
legal and political institutions and instruments, which in turn are based upon
material and ideological supports.” 69
Other authors are also weaponizing Marxism to challenge labor
exploitation under the latest versions of capitalism (and asking whether
labor exploitation can be considered a crime). 70 These theoretical and
empirical contributions are reinvigorating the debate, deepening in the
contradiction of bourgeois law, and liberal state’s inability to control the
excesses of the neoliberal dogma. 71 It can be said that the impunity enjoyed
by the speculators responsible for the 2008 economic crisis brought Marxist
debates back to the front-line of criminology, well represented in the abovementioned works or by new journals such as the Journal of White Collar
and Corporate Crime (first released in January 2020).
The current Marxist critical criminology, focused on the study of
BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMONS SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION AND EMANCIPATION 439–94 (2002).
BAARS, supra note 62, at 13.
See HARRY GLASBEEK, CLASS PRIVILEGE: HOW LAW SHELTERS SHAREHOLDERS AND
CODDLES CAPITALISM 112–13 (2017).
Id. at 51.
STEVE TOMBS & DAVID WHYTE, THE CORPORATE CRIMINAL: WHY CORPORATIONS
MUST BE ABOLISHED 69 (2015).
Jon Davies & Natalia Ollus, Labour Exploitation as Corporate Crime and Harm:
Outsourcing Responsibility in Food Production and Cleaning Services Supply Chains, 72
CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 87, 87–88 (2019).
Spencer Headworth & John L. Hagan, White-Collar Crimes of the Financial Crisis, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 275–93 (Shanna R. Van Slyke, Michael L.
Benson & Francis T. Cullen, eds., 2016).
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corporate crimes, has left some fundamental tenets worth highlighting. As
Marxist scholars repeatedly state, law serves the interest of the dominant
class. 72 One of the most prominent examples of the legal form bias is the
existence of corporations, a legal fiction widely used by the bourgeois to
speculate and extract surplus value from workers. This legal person, while
bearer of similar rights to those of the natural persons, is not criminally liable
in most cases, and therefore enjoys what Baars has described as a structure
of irresponsibility. 73 Thus, when criminal corporations exploit workers, they
would not be acting as deviants, but as functional and necessary elements of
the system. Also, Ideological State Apparatuses—and with them, the
capitalist social formation—are articulated through law, mediating a
significant part of the economic and social life. 74 The legal form is, in turn,
the materialization of capitalist relations of production. This naturalizes
socially harmful behaviors if they benefit the interest of the capitalist class,
for instance, environmental destruction or the exploitation of the working
class.
Finally, institutions involved in law-making and enforcing processes are
not neutral. The legal construction of crime does not respond to arbitrary
acts of public servants; it is indeed a deliberated and calculated political act
responding to very specific interests: those of the capitalist class. The case
of corporate impunity is illustrative of the control of the latter over state
punitive technologies. Of course, this is just among the many examples
probing how the criminal justice system serves the interests of the powerful, 75
white supremacy, 76 and patriarchal domination. 77 In sum, the crimes of the
powerful are defined as behaviors that, despite being socially harmful, are
not prosecuted at all or are prosecuted in a lenient way because they are
functional to the capitalist social formation and benefit the bourgeoisie as a
class. This Article makes a case for the criminalization of digital
See generally ALTHUSSER, supra note 41; BAARS, supra note 62; CRIMES OF THE
POWERFUL, supra note 37; JAMES C. OLESON, CRIMINAL GENIUS: A PORTRAIT OF HIGH-IQ
OFFENDERS xiv (2016) (“Real crime is colonialism, globalization, and neoliberalism. Real
crime is climate change, shock doctrine governance, and unending war. Of course, because
these crimes are the métier of the affluent and powerful, they are not even regarded as crimes:
if governments wanted to wage a war on real crime, they would target too-big-to-fail
corporations and too-big-to-jail plutocrats, even states themselves.”).
BAARS, supra note 62, at 421.
See generally ALTHUSSER, supra note 41.
See generally CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL, supra note 37; see also HANDBOOK, supra note
52; BITTLE ET AL., supra note 57.
NAOMI ZACK, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND BLACK RIGHTS: THE INJUSTICE OF U.S. POLICE
RACIAL PROFILING AND HOMICIDE 1–29 (2015).
See generally ADRIENNE ROBERTS, GENDERED STATES OF PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE:
FEMINIST POLITICAL ECONOMY, PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION & THE LAW (2016).
72
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corporations’ socially harmful behaviors: data crimes. But before moving to
the specifics of data crimes, the broader socio-legal context in which digital
monopolistic corporations are nested must be examined.
III.

THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE OF MONOPOLISTIC
CAPITALISM

Part II of this Article explores the neoliberal governance of capitalist
monopolies. Section II.A explores the limits of antitrust regulation. Section
II.B explores the intrinsically neoliberal quality of the rule of law. Section
II.C introduces the concept of the data crime.

A. Antitrust
In 1905, the United States Supreme Court ruled against the “beef
trust,” a meatpackers’ cartel controlling the meat market, which it found to
be fixing prices for their benefit. 78 This was a victory for the federal
government, as the Court’s ruling recognized Congress’ power to regulate
monopolies, and thus, to intervene in the economy. 79 This landmark ruling
marked the beginning of the period known as the Progressive Era (1890s–
1920s), 80 and was followed by other key Court rulings that reshaped U.S.
capitalism: Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 81 Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 82 and United States v. American Tobacco Co. 83
Progressive liberal constitutionalism established clear limits around the
excessive accumulation of capital in the hands of corporations, using
multiple legal arguments ranging from the protection of competition to the
defense of inalienable individual and collective rights and freedoms. 84 These
progressive tendencies were accentuated after the 1929 stock market crash
and WWII. 85 The nineteenth century version of unchained capitalism had
been overturned in the U.S. by a politically active state and by courts who

Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 (1905).
Edward S. Corwin, The Anti-Trust Acts and the Constitution, 18 VIRGINIA L. REV. 355,
355 (1932).
See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR
(1955).
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1969).
TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 37 (2018).
See JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW,
AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 233 (2001).
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acted as arbiters of the truce between workers and capital. 86
On the other side of the Atlantic, things moved in a different but
parallel manner. The political left, organized through unions and parties
with parliamentary representation, was incrementally gaining power,
especially since the end of WWI. 87 After a period of brutal repression,
progressive political parties were increasingly recognized as legitimate actors
by the ruling classes. 88 Although the participation of socialist political parties
within parliamentary politics lowered the revolutionary expectations of
many citizens, socialist political involvement secured significant social and
economic rights. 89 However, the influence gained by progressive parties in
liberal democracies does not fully explain the emergence of the twentiethcentury European welfare state. Why did it happen?
First, the apparition in 1917 of the Soviet Union, a workerist socialist
alternative to the bourgeois liberal democracy, fed a new generation of
unionists and political organizers. Workers’ unions grew, and party
members could be counted in the millions across Spain and Germany. 90
They challenged the dominant capitalist status quo, proposing revolutionary
laws, organizing strikes, and even taking down the government proclaiming
the triumph of the communes (Spain 1934 and 1936–39) and the council
republic (Munich Soviet Republic of 1919). 91
Second, the rise of far-right movements in the 1930s in countries as
disparate as Germany, Hungary, Japan, Spain, and the United States shook
the foundations of world and local politics, enacting unexpected popular
fronts, aligning liberals, socialists, anarchists, communists, and even
Christian-democratic parties against governments controlled by the German
National Socialist Party or the Italian National Fascist Party. 92 Hence, moved
either because of honest convictions or mere expediency, the dominant
classes negotiated the grounds of a new social contract with workers’ political
organizations. Some countries, like Italy, constitutionalized a truce between
work and capital, establishing what has been named as the social state with

See K. Sabeel Rahman & Kathleen A. Thelen, The Rise of the Platform Business Model
and the Transformation of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, 47 POL. & SOC. 177, 190–91

86

(2019).
ANDREW THORPE, A HISTORY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY 114–35 (2015).
See ADAM PRZEWORSKI, CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 171–204 (1986).
See generally BRUCE DESMOND GRAHAM, CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC ORDER: THE
FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, 1937–1950 (2006).
See generally BEN FOWKES, COMMUNISM IN GERMANY UNDER THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC
(1984).
See generally PIERRE BROUÉ, THE GERMAN REVOLUTION, 1917–1923 (2004).
JULIAN JACKSON, THE POPULAR FRONT IN FRANCE: DEFENDING DEMOCRACY, 1934–38,
85–145 (1990).
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the anti-fascist constitution of 1947. 93 Antonio Negri described this process
as the constitutionalizing of work/labor exploitation and the reconstruction
of capital, 94 now under certain restrictions such as the recognition of
workers’ rights and a limited wealth distribution. Other westernized
countries, such as the UK, adopted a social democratic approach to the
economy and undertook the nationalization of key economic sectors, from
railways to energy and communications. 95
Thus, the capitalist legal infrastructure of westernized countries was
modulated in two ways. First, restrictions on excessive capital accumulation
were effectively enforced via a real increase in salaries. Second, as a
consequence of the wider recognition of social rights, states ensured
generalized access to services such as education, health, and transportation. 96
Of course, this complex legal machinery was dismantled during the
neoliberal revolution, unleashing the flow of capital, allowing unchecked
accumulation of capital, and fundamentally substituting the controls of
public law with corporate self-regulation. 97 During the mid-1970s, the
influential Chicago School, well-represented by academics and jurists
Robert Bork and Richard Posner, argued against the progressive structurefocused approach to antitrust, and following neoliberal dogma, proposed to
replace it with the Chicago price theory. 98 As Lena Khan has pointed out,
paraphrasing Posner:
The essence of the Chicago School position is that “the proper
lens for viewing antitrust problems is price theory.” Foundational
to this view is a faith in the efficiency of markets, propelled by
profit-maximizing actors. The Chicago School approach bases its
vision of industrial organization on a simple theoretical premise:
“[R]ational economic actors working within the confines of the
Donald Sassoon, The Role of the Italian Communist Party in the Consolidation of
Parliamentary Democracy in Italy, in SECURING DEMOCRACY POLITICAL PARTIES AND

93

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE 84–103 (Geoffrey Pridham, ed.,
1990).
ANTONIO NEGRI & MICHAEL HARDT, LABOR OF DIONYSUS: A CRITIQUE OF STATE-FORM
45–52 (1994).
See generally ROBERT MILLWARD & JOHN SINGLETON, EDS., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF NATIONALISATION IN BRITAIN, 1920–1950 (2002).
See generally KATHLEEN A. THELEN, UNION OF PARTS: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTWAR
GERMANY (1991).
Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, The Global Financial Crisis, Neoclassical Economics, and the
Neoliberal Years of Capitalism, 7 REVUE DE LA RÉGULATION, CAPITALISME, INSTITUTIONS,
POUVOIRS, 20 (2010).
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 15–106
(1978); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 926–35 (1978).
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market seek to maximize profits by combining inputs in the most
efficient manner. A failure to act in this fashion will be punished
by the competitive forces of the market.” 99
The ideology of the Chicago School was promptly adopted by
conservative judges and justices, manifesting as mainstream legal policy
under Ronald Reagan’s presidency. 100 This legal ideology began to take root
in the 1970s, assume control in the 1980s, and then consolidate in the
1990s, resulting in the neoliberal rule of law. 101

B. The Neoliberal Rule of Law
The neoliberal rule of law could be described as the corporate-friendly
and antipublic regulatory governance deployed by neoliberal governments
since the 1970s. 102 It implicates a variety of policies and legal strategies
intended to strengthen the private sector while stripping down to the
minimum the public sector. Among the techniques of neoliberal
governance, we find the privatization of public assets, 103 the war on unions, 104
and the dismantlement of the antitrust and financial regulatory framework. 105
The privatization of public monopolies is especially relevant with regards to
the rise of privately owned, but state-backed, telecommunication
monopolies in countries such as France (Orange, formerly France
Telecom) or Spain (Telefónica). There, formerly public assets became
gigantic corporations profiting on a global scale. 106 This came along with the
strengthening of corporate rights. To exemplify, since the U.S. Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in 2010, Citizens United v. the Federal Election
Commission, corporate rights include free speech, especially relevant to
Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 719 (2016).
Id. at 720.
Id. at 718–19.
See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 65 (2005); Khan, supra note
99, at 716.
HARVEY, supra note 102, at 65.
See generally, e.g., THOMAS G. ANDREWS, KILLING FOR COAL: AMERICA’S DEADLIEST
LABOR WAR 1–19 (2008); TRADE UNIONS IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD (Gary Daniels & John
McIlroy, eds., 2009).
See Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965), reprinted in THE MAKING
OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert
Hovenkamp eds., 2013).
Fabio Bulfone, The State Strikes Back: Industrial Policy, Regulatory Power and the
Divergent Performance of Telefonica and Telecom Italia, 26 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 752, 766–
67 (2019).
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technology companies such as Facebook. 107
A parallel process to the dismantlement of public monopolies was the
privatization of public services. Public entities, such as water treatment
plants, 108 the welfare system, 109 aspects of the public education system, 110 or
even of the criminal justice system, 111 were externalized into the private
sector. The same thing happened to the Internet, which was privatized
between 1990 and 2000. 112 That led not only to the private management of
digital infrastructure but also to colonization of what is produced in the
cyberspace, including what is today considered the most important public
utility: data. This has not only impacted the economy, but also the collective
imaginary. Another of the neoliberal revolution’s priorities was to
undermine the power of unions, ending with it a tradition of collective
bargaining regulated by public law. The public labor law framework was
replaced by a corporate-friendly regulatory framework, where private
companies defined the contractual and working conditions between
companies and their workers, with little or no state oversight whatsoever. 113
This precarization of working conditions and labor law, along with the
extraordinary development of technological surveillance tools, settled the
grounds for today’s unprotected situation of the digital proletariat. 114
The neoliberal rule of law institutionalized forms of previously illegal
macro-speculative flows of capital. For some, the process which unleashed
the movement of capital in the early 2000s is explained as a consequence of
de-regulation, or more appropriately, neoliberal governance of the financial
sector in the 1980s and 1990s. 115 However, what actually happened was a

Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PRIVATIZATION OF WATER SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE, at 20 (2002).
See generally SHEILA B. KAMERMAN & ALFRED J. KAHN, PRIVATIZATION AND THE
WELFARE STATE (1989).
See generally ANTONI VERGER, CLARA FONTDEVILA & ADRIÁN ZANCAJO, THE
PRIVATIZATION OF EDUCATION: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL EDUCATION REFORM
(2016).
See generally Veena Dubal, The Drive to Precarity: A Political History of Work,
Regulation, & Labor Advocacy in San Francisco’s Taxi & Uber Economies, 38 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 73 (2017).
Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Privatization of the Internet’s Backbone Network, 51
J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 93, 95–100 (2007).
See generally SCOTT LASH & JOHN URRY, THE END OF ORGANIZED CAPITALISM (1987);
TREBOR SCHOLZ, UBERWORKED AND UNDERPAID: HOW WORKERS ARE DISRUPTING THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY (2017).
See generally SCHOLZ, supra note 113.
See ÖZGÜR ORHANGAZI, Financial Deregulation and the 2007–08 US Financial Crisis,
in THE DEMISE OF FINANCE-DOMINATED CAPITALISM, 289–307 (2015).
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transfer of sovereignty over economic matters, from states to corporations. 116
Financial providers, banks, and venture funds were granted self-regulatory
powers. 117 Notwithstanding the incalculable social harm caused by the
criminal speculative activities of financial providers and creditors during the
2007–2008 global financial crisis, a mere forty-seven bankers went to jail
(and of these, half were from Iceland). 118 Despite the tremendous damage
of the global financial crisis, estimated at $22 trillion in the U.S. alone, 119 and
the theatrical show-trial of Bernie Madoff, speculative business remained
open as usual. 120 Venture capital firms reoriented their capital from the land
rentier economy to the tech rentier economy. 121
Taking advantage of the crisis and confusion caused by the collapse of
the dot-com bubble and the 2008 crisis, tech corporations grew in a capitalrich world unbounded by the circulation of goods and characterized by the
rise of tech-rentier capitalism controlled by global speculators. 122 These
corporations have comfortably deployed their activities in open markets,
with weak unions, and with workers rapidly losing formerly concrete rights.
Digital capitalists have skillfully exploited the neoliberal state’s legal
architecture, and when they have been strong enough, they have criminally
challenged it by taking advantage of globalization. In other words, digital
capitalists have been exploiting both the erosion of state sovereignty and the
fragmentation of the working class. 123
The neoliberal rule of law model has been incapable of intervening
and regulating the digital economy or prosecuting the crimes of digital
corporations. So far, the timid (and never punitive—although this might
change) measures of the vestigial federal antitrust agencies have been unable
to stop the illegal activities of powerful corporations. Companies who
116

See id.

Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and SelfRegulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, at 103–05 (2001).
Laura Noonan, Cale Tilford, Richard Milne, Ian Mount & Peter Wise, Who Went to Jail
for Their Role in the Financial Crisis?, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://ig.ft.com/jailed117

118

bankers/ [https://perma.cc/RBV9-APGE].
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: FINANCIAL
CRISIS LOSSES AND POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE FRANK-DODD ACT (2013),
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13–180 [https://perma.cc/NS29-4KBY].
See generally COLLEEN P. EREN, BERNIE MADOFF AND THE CRISIS: THE PUBLIC TRIAL
OF CAPITALISM (Stanford Univ. Press, 2017).
See generally Jathan Sadowski, The Internet of Landlords: Digital Platforms and New
Mechanisms of Rentier Capitalism, 52 ANTIPODE 562 (2020).
See generally Kean Birch, Technoscience Rent: Toward A Theory of Rentiership for
Technoscientific Capitalism, 45 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 3 (2020).
See generally Kathleen A. Thelen, Regulating Uber: The Politics of the Platform Economy
in Europe and the United States, 16 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 938 (2018).
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dominate the global market, like Google, obtain huge profits from this
situation, and maintain near-absolute technological dominance in fields
such as machine learning. But perhaps what is more important is that the
neoliberal state has been ideologically disarmed, having stripped itself of the
most fundamental sovereign instruments to intervene in national economic
processes that occur within its borders. This disempowerment came with
no adequate legal instruments to force corporations to comply with law, nor
make them accountable for their violations. As a result, big tech
monopolists can impose their legal ideology—the western version of digital
capitalism—or as it has been called: the silicon doctrine. 124
The crushing power of contemporary technology monopolies invites
comparison, with only slight hyperbole, to the notorious Ludlow
massacre, 125 fictionalized in D.W. Griffith’s 1916 film masterpiece,
Intolerance. 126 Perhaps this scenario of dystopian digital dominance explains
the state’s antitrust backlash. Many scholars, activists, and political
organizations are turning back to the study of the old legal progressive era. 127
As Campbell Jones observes, the return of economic planning has arrived. 128
Formerly vilified nationalization and economic planning policies are
attracting attention and are once again being discussed seriously. Hence, old
ideas and new formulas are being evaluated to counter technological
capitalism and its unbridled, elusive power. Disciplines as different as
politics, economics, communication, engineering, urban studies, and
sociology are taking part. Now we are prepared to deal with the relevant
question: What are the crimes inherent to digital capitalism?
Section II.C examines data crimes. The concept encompasses two
kinds of criminogenic behaviors from which digital corporations have
especially benefited. The first kind of data crime involves privacy violations
and data mismanagement. The second kind relates to the breaching of
competition rules. These two types of violations have been traditionally
Jiménez, supra note 27, at 322.
See generally ANDREWS, supra note 104.
JAMES C. OLESON, Writing History with Lightning: D. W. Griffith’s Intolerance and the
Imagined Past, in INTOLERANCE, POLEMICS, AND DEBATE IN ANTIQUITY: POLITICO124
125
126

CULTURAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND RELIGIOUS FORMS OF CRITICAL CONVERSATION IN THE
ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN, BIBLICAL, GRAECO-ROMAN, AND EARLY-ISLAMIC WORLD 546
(George van Kooten & Jacques van Ruiten eds., 2019).
See generally Konstantin Medvedovsky, Hipster Antitrust: A Brief Fling or Something
More?, COMPETITION
POL’Y
INT’L
(Apr.
17,
2018),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/hipster-antitrust-a-brief-fling-or-somethingmore/ [https://perma.cc/4VNZ-5MLS]; Lina Khan, Sources of Tech Platform Power, 2
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 325 (2018).
See generally Campbell Jones, Introduction: The Return of Economic Planning, 119 S.
ATL. Q. 1 (2020).
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presented as disconnected with no interdependency whatsoever. But this
has changed in the hands of digital capitalists who have exploited their
control over data to seize control of market dominance.

C. Data Crimes
Orla Lynskey was among the few scholars who, as early as 2014, called
attention to the key role data was playing in the shape of a new form of
corporate power. 129 Her works analyzing the political and legal roots of the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) 130 laid the foundation
for her conceptualization of a new and influential form of corporate power:
data power. The concept is used to describe the power digital corporations
exert on politics, society, and markets, relying on their dominant position
over data management. Lynskey justified her decision to employ the notion
of data power instead of following alternatives such as platform or market
power, because:
Whereas market power concerns the constraints placed on a
company by its competitors and consumers on a particular
market and on the economic harms that may follow from the
exercise of such power, a more comprehensive conception of
power is needed in order to capture adequately the power that
data-intensive companies wield. Data power is a multifaceted
form of power available to digital platforms, arising from their
control over data flows. As online platforms act as an interface
between their various constituents (content providers, advertisers,
individual users, etc.), they are in a unique position to control the
flow of information between participants in the digital ecosystem,
and to gather data about the actions of each of these parties in the
digital sphere. 131
As Lynskey explained, control of user data by digital corporations
grounds their dominance over markets and strengthens their political
influence. 132 For her, a revaluation of data protection and competition laws
See generally Orla Lynskey, Deconstructing Data Protection: The ‘Added-Value’ of a
Right to Data Protection in the EU Legal Order, 63 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 569 (2014).
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Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1,
43–45, 87 [Hereinafter GDPR].
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is required to adequately regulate the rising “platform power.” 133 However,
one question arises: Is that even possible? Some of the biggest tech
companies—including Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Microsoft—have achieved their dominant position through the violation of
data and competition laws. 134 And despite being found guilty, those
companies not only have not stopped their activities, but persist in them. 135
They recidivate deliberately and repeatedly. As demonstrated in this Article,
countless court rulings, institutional reports, and academic works shows that
the relationship between digital corporations and crime is not casual, but
structural.
This Article goes one step further from Lynksey’s notion of data
power, a situation of corporate domination that, in Lynskey’s opinion, could
be regulated. 136 Instead, this Article reconsiders data power as the
consequence of a deliberate criminal strategy, fundamental to digital
capitalism, inseparable from its business model, and therefore,
uncorrectable with conventional means. This criminal strategy manifests in
data crimes. Data crimes relate to upstream and downstream data
operations, data extraction, trading, management, processing, and analysis
(among others). That is, data crimes involve a variety of behaviors,
processes, mechanisms, actions, and actors, all of them necessary to
perpetrate an abusive, unlawful, and exploitative data extraction. These
operations aim to reach a socially harmful market domination. In short, data
crimes are the corporate violation of data and competition rules, aiming to
seize a socially harmful dominant position. However, before outlining this
argument, several points central to an understanding of data crimes must be
clarified to specify how this form of criminality relates with the material
conditions of digital capitalism’s globalized political economy.
For some, cyberspace, and with it the digital economy, should not be
regulated following the same rules as the “real world.” This position is well
represented by John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace,” in which Barlow fiercely advocates for a libertarian utopian
cyberspace, completely free of state interference:

Orla Lynskey, Regulating Platform Power, LSE Working Papers (2017); Francisco CostaCabral & Orla Lynskey, Family Ties: The Intersection Between Data Protection and
Competition in EU Law, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11, 30 (2017).
See generally Competition Law and Data, AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE &
BUNDESKARTELLAMT (May 10, 2016) (Ger.).
Natasha Lomas, Google’s Adtech Targeted by Publisher Antitrust Complaint in EU,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 11, 2022), https://techcrunch.com/2022/02/11/epc-google-antitrustcomplaint/ [https://perma.cc/926Y-PWB3].
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Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You
are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we
gather. We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have
one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with
which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space
we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you
seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do
you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to
fear. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of
the governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We
did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you know our
world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think
that you can build it, as though it were a public construction
project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself
through our collective actions. 137
At the time Barlow issued his Declaration, it was not difficult to see
cyberspace as a utopian immaterial place, disentangled from the “real
world.” However, today we are aware of how deeply connected the digital
and analogical spheres are by the same material conditions of exploitation.
For instance, cyberspace would not exist without what has been labeled as
the physical Internet, which among other things includes networks, data
centers, energy plants, and of course the millions of workers feeding the
machinery of digital capitalism. Despite all the evidence, Barlow’s cyberlibertarianism has been Silicon Valley’s mantra for years, producing today’s
disastrous situation of corporate dominance.
Following Joseph Sommer and Frank H. Easterbrook, 138 this Article
also rejects the idea of cyberlaw as a specific and differentiated body of law.
Cyberspace is as material as the house you live in or the road you often
drive. It is a space that, although digital, is hosting palpable material relations
of production. For instance, as these lines are written under the coronavirus
quarantine, thousands of workers have been told not to go to their working
places and instead, telecommute. Cyberspace exists, for sure, but as a very
material place that should be subjected to the same rule of law as anywhere
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. BLOG (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
[https://perma.cc/RZ48-LN63].
Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147 (2000); see
Frank. H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of The Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208
(1996) (concluding that the best approach to cyber law is to develop a sound intellectual
property law and then apply it to the Internet).
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else. Hence, data crimes should not be considered as cybercrime, but as
crime. It is an extremely serious form of criminality causing tremendous
social harm, affecting the social and economic life of countries and
continents, limiting freedom and technological development. 139
This Article recognizes that the taxonomy of crimes here proposed
entails multiple nuances and raises relevant technical questions: should data
crimes be considered a crime? If there is a crime, where does it occur?
What principle should be followed to prosecute such kinds of crimes?
Territoriality? Active personality? Passive personality? These are utterly
important questions given the nearly universal extension of digital business,
the newness of coexistence with the digital sphere, and the pace of
technological changes—all of which are difficult to answer.
There is also another thing to consider. As we will see, corporate
criminal liability—and more widely speaking, the way we think of criminal
law—has been mediated by the capitalist ideology. This has helped to shape
what Baars has labeled as a structure of corporate irresponsibility.140
Thinking about the criminalization of data crimes entails considerable
technical challenges, but before we can even consider those technical
aspects, we should carefully think about the nature of the crimes of digital
capitalism. That is the aim of Part III. Section III.A examines the ways in
which digital corporations have violated privacy laws, while Section III.B
focuses on the violation of competition laws. Part III scrutinizes Facebook,
one of the most successful (and representative) companies of digital
capitalism.
IV.

DATA PRIVACY

Until recently, the different regulatory frameworks regarding privacy
rights were mostly intended to protect individuals from state surveillance.
As early as 1970, the nascent European Community already had a robust
data protection legal framework, reflecting the legal development of the
Federal German Republic, prone to demonstrate its “democratic”
credentials in contraposition of the Democratic German Republic, accused
of operating mass surveillance over its population. 141 The right-based
European legal regime firmly advocated for a strong take on citizens’ control
See Nick Couldry & Ulises Mejias, Data Colonialism: Rethinking Big Data’s Relation to
the Contemporary Subject, 20 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 336, 336 (2019).
Baars, supra note 32, at 421 (citing Steve Tombs & David Whyte, The Corporate Criminal.
Why Corporations Must Be Abolished in KEY IDEAS IN CRIMINOLOGY (2015)).
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over their data and privacy. 142 However, the legislation was mostly targeting
the public management of data, and hence it was insufficient to tackle the
corporate data revolution. 143
The regulation of data privacy and data rights in the U.S. was, although
different in its motivation, similar in its results. 144 Publicly managed data was
regulated at a federal level, whereas privately managed data remained
fragmented because it was state regulated due to intense corporate
lobbying. 145 So, by the time that the surveillance capitalism arrived, making
data one of the most valuable assets—and consequently followed by a
plethora of data-thirsty corporations—public authorities were disarmed and
unprepared for the digital capitalist offensive. 146
In 2012, amid a palpable evolution of the digital economy, the
European Commission proposed a comprehensive reform of its data
protection rules which would result in the General Data Protection
Regulation. 147 Consistent with previous European legislation on privacy, the
text of the GDPR proposes management of data that, while not opposed to
its processing and commodification, does require the express consent of
users, conceived not as consumers but as citizens with rights. 148 In the EU,
the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right, a key aspect of human
dignity. 149 That is the ideological inspiring principle of the GDPR:
The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of
personal data is a fundamental right. Article 8(1) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’)
and Article 16(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) provide that everyone has the right to
the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 150
Id.
See generally John Shattuck & Mathias Risse, Privacy, Personal Data, and Surveillance:
Reimagining Rights & Responsibilities in the United States, CARR CTR. HUM. RTS. POL’Y
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(2021).
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See id. at 15–22.
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Id. at 22.
See id. at 22–25.
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European Commission Press Release IP 12/46, Commission Proposes a Comprehensive
Reform of Data Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of their Data and to Cut Costs
for
Businesses
(Jan.
25,
2012),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_12_46 [https://perma.cc/6C7PBLSY].
See generally Paul Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771
(2019).
Id. at 772.
GDPR, supra note 130, at 1.
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Even more important is what is mentioned in Article 8 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union:
Article 8 - Protection of personal data 1. Everyone has the right
to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 2. Such
data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the
right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be
subject to control by an independent authority. 151
Hence, from a legal perspective, a privacy violation is a violation of a
fundamental right, at least for those living in the European Union. 152 For its
part, the U.S. was following a different path. A document written by the
EU’s directorate general for internal policies with the explicit title of A

Comparison Between U.S. and EU Data Protection Legislation for Law
Enforcement Purposes pointed at the gap between the EU’s and U.S.’s legal
frameworks:
The most prominent and important divergence concerns the
constitutional protection of personal data. While data protection
and privacy are fundamental rights in the EU and are also
applicable in the LE context, there is no equivalent protection in
the US. The EU’s understanding of these rights have been shaped
since the 1970s by comprehensive case law of the ECtHR and
was been further developed in recent years through important
EU instruments such as the Directive 95/46/EC, the TFEU and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as the EU courts’ case
law. The US, with its restrictions to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, through the Third-Party Doctrine, and the
exclusion of non-US persons from both the Fourth Amendment
and the Privacy Act protection, follow a very different approach,
which is contrary to the EU’s perspective of privacy and data
protection as comprehensive fundamental rights. 153

The EU’s data protection rules became the role model of digital socioliberal legislation. It does not prevent corporations from managing private
Id. art. 8.
See id.
Directorate-General for Internal Policies Study: A Comparison Between US and EU Data
Protection Legislation for Law Enforcement Purposes, at 1, 67 COM (2015).
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data, but, in coherence with the comprehensive EU’s social human rights
frameworks, it protects and empowers citizens from blatantly abusive
corporate behaviors, conferring them agency over their data, as well as
confirming EU’s jurisdiction, and hence legal protection, over EU citizens’
data. 154 This agreement, which received the support of the broad European
Parliament’s ideological spectrum, was harshly opposed by Silicon Valley,
triggering a legal and political war between EU institutions and Silicon
Valley, evidencing with it a wider geopolitical conflict. 155 In the end, as has
been revealed, what was in dispute were the terms under which European
users’ data—one of the most valuable assets of the digital economy—would
be harvested. In Section III.A, this Article briefly summarize some aspects
of Facebook’s litigation related to its, in the words of Germany’s national
competitor regulator, “exploitative business.” 156
V.

FACEBOOK DATA CRIMES

A. Facebook and Privacy Violations
Facebook is one of the corporations obtaining great benefit from
breaching privacy laws. 157 It has built a virtual monopoly on communication
out of the voluntary and involuntary exploitation of users’ and non-users’
data. 158 Moreover, it can be said that privacy violation is written in its DNA. 159
Facebook’s predecessor was FaceMash, an extraordinarily simple web
application. 160 It displayed the photo of two Harvard students at a time,
allowing its users to choose the “hottest” of them. 161 Its coder, then-Harvardundergraduate Mark Zuckerberg, was accused by Harvard’s Administrative
Board of copyright and privacy violation because he used, without
permission, photos from nine Harvard Houses uploaded to the web. 162 In
declarations to a Harvard newspaper, Zuckerberg stated that “I understood
See id. at 11–13.
See e.g., Max Schrems, Behind the European Privacy Ruling That’s Confounding Silicon
Valley,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
9,
2015),
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Bundeskartellamt [FCO] [Federal Cartel Office] Feb. 6, 2019, B6-22/19.
See generally House of Commons, supra note 5, at 111.
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that some parts were still a little sketchy and I wanted some more time to
think about whether or not this was really appropriate to release to the
Harvard community.” 163
Facebook’s criminal history could be divided into three different
periods: Disruption (2004–2007), Suspicion (2008–2015), and Domination
(2015–Present). 164 The distinction of these three periods is based on relevant
episodes of Facebook’s long history of litigation, which are in fact landmarks
of contemporary digital capitalism. 165 Each of them represents a qualitative
leap in Facebook’s scale of privacy violation. 166
Despite the FaceMash precedent, when Facebook appeared in 2004,
the public was not really concerned with privacy issues. 167 In fact, media and
society alike were charmed with Facebook’s big leap forward in social
networking. 168 In an extraordinarily short period, Facebook surpassed its
direct competitor, the microblog site MySpace. 169 Controversy, however,
didn’t arise until November 2007, just one month after Microsoft heavily
invested in the company, 170 when Facebook launched Beacon, a new
advertisement system. 171 Third-party sellers provided Facebook with
information about online activities of its clients, mainly purchases. 172
Facebook then contrasted that information with its database and broadcast
that information through its users’ newsfeed and profile, without user’s
consent. 173 In other words, Facebook was profiting off of users’ private

163
164
165
166
167
168

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Catherine Dwyer, Starr Roxanne Hiltz & Katia Passerini, Trust and Privacy Concern
Within Social Networking Sites: A Comparison of Facebook and Myspace, AMCIS 2007
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PROCEEDINGS, 339 (2007).
Dan Fromer & Rani Molla, It’s Been 10 Years Since Microsoft Invested in Facebook Now
Facebook is Worth Almost as Much as Microsoft,VOX (Oct. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM EDT),
https://www.vox.com/2017/10/23/16412108/facebook-microsoft-2007-investment-marketcap-chart [https://perma.cc/27R7-LAA6].
Juan C. Perez, Facebook’s Beacon More Intrusive Than Previously Thought, PCWORLD
(Nov.
30,
2007),
https://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/200756/ca_facebook_beacon_more_intrusive_than
_previously_thought/?pp=2 [https://perma.cc/R4BR-AFNS]; Brad Stone, Facebook
Executive Discusses Beacon Brouhaha, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2007),
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/facebook-responds-to-beacon-brouhaha/
[https://perma.cc/83TR-JX9J].
Perez, supra note 171; Stone, supra note 171.
Perez, supra note 171; Stone, supra note 171.
170

171

172
173

998

2022]

THE CRIMES OF DIGITAL CAPITALISM

999

data. 174 This resulted in a class-action lawsuit ending in a settlement in which
Facebook agreed to create a $9.5 million fund for a privacy foundation. 175
This was widely criticized by privacy rights organizations, such as the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”), which stated, “With this
structure, the proposed Privacy Foundation will not be sufficiently
independent of Facebook to serve as an effective tool for consumer privacy
protection.” 176
The second phase of Facebook’s criminal saga with the courts began
with a complaint filed before the Irish Data Protection Commissioner in
2013 by one of its users, a law student named Max Schrems. Schrems, who
is also a privacy activist, was concerned with his data being transferred from
Facebook’s subsidiary in Ireland to Facebook’s data servers which were in
the U.S. As EPIC reported:
[Schrems] contended in his complaint that the law and practice
in force in that country did not ensure adequate protection of the
personal data held in its territory against the surveillance activities
that were engaged in there by the public authorities. Mr Schrems
referred in this regard to the revelations made by Edward
Snowden concerning the activities of the United States
intelligence services, in particular those of the National Security
Agency (‘the NSA’) . . . Since the Commissioner took the view
that he was not required to investigate the matters raised by
Mr Schrems in the complaint, he rejected it as unfounded. The
Commissioner considered that there was no evidence that
Mr Schrems’ personal data had been accessed by the NSA. 177
Schrems appealed the rejected complaint before the Irish High
Court, which referred several questions to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (“CJEU”). 178 What started as an individual complaint
Dawn Jutla, Layering Privacy on Operating Systems, Social Networks, and Other Platforms
by Design, 3 IDENTITY INFO. SOC’Y 319, 320 (2010); see Couldry & Mejias, supra note 139,
174

at 336.
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 816 (9th Cir. 2012).
Letter from Electronic Privacy Information Center, Center for Digital Democracy,
Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of American, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse &
Patient Privacy Rights, to Honorable Richard G. Seeborg, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of
Cal. San Jose Div,.Lane v. Facebook, Proposed Settlement, Case No. 5:08-CV-03845-RS
(Jan.
15,
2010),
https://epic.org/wpcontent/uploads/privacy/facebook/EPIC_Beacon_Letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9WYRH78A].
Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650¶¶ 28–29 (Oct. 6,
2015).
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against a potential privacy violation ended in a judicial decision of global
impact. The 2014 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner Rule of the
CJEU declared the Safe Harbor privacy principles, framing the data flows
between the EU and U.S. invalid. In the opinion of Yves Bot, the Court’s
Advocate General:
[T]he scale and scope of United States surveillance programmes
raised concerns over the continuity of protection of personal data
lawfully transferred to the United States under the safe harbour
scheme. It observed that all companies involved in the PRISM
programme, which grant access to United States authorities to
data stored and processed in the United States, appear to be
certified under the safe harbour scheme. According to the
Commission, this has made the safe harbour scheme one of the
conduits through which access is given to United States
intelligence authorities to the collecting of personal data initially
processed in the European Union . . . It follows from these factors
that the law and practice of the United States allow the large-scale
collection of the personal data of citizens of the Union which is
transferred under the safe harbour scheme, without those citizens
benefiting from effective judicial protection. 179
The Schrems case embodied the transition to a new era of global data
politics. It became clear that Facebook was a major actor in the new
geopolitical game where data was fiercely disputed. Facebook’s next data
privacy scandal arrived just two and half years later, opening the era of
constant massive privacy violation. On May 7, 2017, an article published
by Carolle Cadwalladr in The Guardian flagged the attention of the global
public with resounding words: “A shadowy global operation involving big
data, billionaire friends of Trump and the disparate forces of the Leave
campaign influenced the result of the EU referendum. As Britain heads to
the polls again, is our electoral process still fit for purpose?” 180 That was
the beginning of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, a case that forever
changed politics, media, populism, and of course, data and privacy.
A year and a half later, on October 24, 2018, the Information
Commissioner Office (“ICO”), UK’s privacy watchdog, fined Facebook
£500.000 (the maximum fine) for its involvement in the Cambridge
Id. ¶¶157–58.
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Analytica scandal. 181 As reported in the ICO’s investigation into the use of
data analytics in political campaigns places, 182 the data of around 87 million
Facebook users, of which one million were UK citizens and 300,000 were
Australians, 183 was harvested by consultancy company Cambridge Analytica
using deceptive tactics and with the complicity of Facebook. 184 The data
was used to micro-target users with private messages and content during
two specially contested political campaigns: the UK’s EU membership
referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 185 In a declaration
before the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport International
Grand Committee, Elizabeth Denham, ICO’s commissioner, stated:
We fined Facebook because it allowed applications and
application developers to harvest the personal information of its
customers who had not given their informed consent—think of
friends, and friends of friends—and then Facebook failed to keep
the information safe . . . It is not a case of no harm, no foul.
Companies are responsible for proactively protecting personal
information and that’s been the case in the UK for thirty years . .
. Facebook broke data protection law, and it is disingenuous for
Facebook to compare that to email forwarding, because that is
not what it is about; it is about the release of users’ profile
information without their knowledge and consent. 186
In 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center submitted an
amicus curiae brief in a “privacy suit brought against Facebook to challenge
the company’s use of cookies to track Facebook users even after they have
logged out of the platform.” 187 Facebook’s product management director
admitted to the fact but considered it essential to improve “product and
services.” 188 On January 29th, The New York Times reported that Facebook

INFO. COMM’RS OFF., INVESTIGATION INTO THE USE OF DATA ANALYTICS IN POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS A REPORT TO PARLIAMENT (Nov. 8, 2018) (UK).
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settled a lawsuit that would cost the company around $550 million. 189
Facebook violated Illinois’ privacy law with its facial recognition tool;
basically, Facebook enabled their auto-tagging tool without consent, and
with it, harvested a massive amount of sensitive biometric data. 190 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated, “[T]he panel
concluded that the development of a face template using facial-recognition
technology without consent (as alleged in this case) invades an individual’s
private affairs and concrete interests.” 191 California Attorney General Xavier
Becerra petitioned the San Francisco Superior Court to order Facebook
to comply with a subpoena issued by the California Attorney General on
June 17, 2019:
In 2018, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra launched
an investigation into the business practices of Facebook Inc.,
following widespread that Facebook allowed third parties to
harvest Facebook’s user’s private information. What initially
began as enquiry into the Cambridge Analytica scandal expanded
over time to become an investigation into whether Facebook has
violated California law, by among other things, deceiving users,
and ignoring its own policies and allowing third parties broad
access to user data. 192
One month after the subpoena was issued, the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) imposed an unprecedented $5 billion penalty on
Facebook, as “‘[d]espite repeated promises to its billions of users worldwide
that they could control how their personal information is shared, Facebook
undermined consumers’ choices.’” 193 Multiple investigations against
Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook To Pay $550 Million To Settle Facial Recognition
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019).
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Facebook are still works-in-progress. As evidenced, the breach of privacy
laws is common practice among one of the leading tech companies.
Facebook is an incorrigible recidivist, and, at least under the EU’s
perspective, is a human rights violator. Yet Facebook has been heavily fined
for its repeated data privacy violations, and under a cost/benefit analysis, the
company still wins by breaking the law. It would be a mistake, however, to
demonize only a single company for what is a common pattern in the big
tech industry. Digital capitalism depends on the appropriation and
exploitation of private data; for that reason, it has been defined as
surveillance capitalism or information capitalism. 194

B. Facebook’s Problems with Competition Law
One of the defining features of the new digital business was the
network effects of the new social media (a service’s value increases as the
number of users increases), thereby forcing platform companies to escalate,
quickly and massively, to make profits. Being dominant in a market was not
only beneficial, but the only way to secure profits in the most relevant
markets. This fact is eloquently summarized by Peter Thiel: “Competition
is for Losers.” 195 For Silicon Valley, corporate dominance is a positive
attribute that, contrary to what some argue, does not strangle innovation:
The dynamism of new monopolies itself explains why old
monopolies don’t strangle innovation. With Apple’s iOS at the
forefront, the rise of mobile computing has dramatically reduced
Microsoft ‘decades-long operating system dominance. Before
that, IBM’s hardware monopoly of the ’60s and ’70s was
overtaken by Microsoft’s software monopoly. AT&T had a
monopoly on telephone service for most of the 20th century, but
now anyone can get a cheap cell phone plan from any number of
providers. If the tendency of monopoly businesses were to hold
back progress, they would be dangerous and we’d be right to
oppose them. But the history of progress is a history of better
monopoly businesses replacing incumbents . . . Monopolies drive
progress because the promise of years or even decades of
monopoly profits provides a powerful incentive to innovate.
194
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Then monopolies can keep innovating because profits enable
them to make the long-term plans and to finance the ambitious
research projects that firms locked in competition can’t dream
of. 196
In the race to dominance, digital capitalism simultaneously broke
privacy and competition rules. 197 The problem was that the regulatory
framework was not ready (or intended) to contain the youthful, creative,
imaginative, and energetic criminal activities of companies like Google or
Facebook. Let us remember that the progressive antitrust and
antimonopolist rules conceived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in the U.S. were aimed to tackle not only corporate market power,
but also corporate political power. But, as we have seen, the neoliberal
revolution, blessed by the Chicago School’s intellectuals, dismantled the
progressive-era antitrust legislation that could have served to stop tech
power.
The consumer-centered approach of the neoliberal hegemonic take
on antitrust was: as long as prices are not growing as a result of the lack of
competition, everything is fine. 198 This, along with the narrow interpretation
of entry barriers—which is the price a company has to pay to enter a
particular market—has been useless in the new digital ecosystem of network
effects, two-sided markets, and zero-price products. 199 In fact, it was not clear
what the commodity or who the client was. 200 For instance, is Facebook
Messenger a product offered by Facebook to its clients in exchange for data?
Or is Messenger the means to take advantage of resource-rich users by
extracting valuable data, which will later be sold to Facebook’s real clients:
the ones paying for the ads in the platform (making 98% of Facebook’s
revenues)? 201 Some have considered that digital platforms, such as
Facebook, are a good example of two-sided (or multisided) markets,
meaning that there are different groups of users benefiting in different ways
from the network effects created by the corporation. 202 For others, it is a
PETER THIEL & BLAKE MASTERS, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO
BUILD THE FUTURE 33 (2014).
Marcus Botta & Klaus Wiedemann, The Interaction of EU Competition, Consumer, and
196
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Data Protection Law in The Digital Economy: The Regulatory Dilemma in the Facebook
Odyssey, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 428 (2019).
See generally Commission Report, supra note 2.
See id.
See id.
Trefis Team, What Is Facebook’s Revenue Breakdown?, NASDAQ (Mar. 28, 2019),
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place of capitalist exploitation, accumulating users’ data. 203 Whether
benevolent or evil, as we are about to see, corporate titans such as Facebook
have become monopolies.
In 2014, the European Union allowed Facebook’s discussed
acquisition of WhatsApp (European Commission v. Facebook). 204 Two
years earlier, Facebook showed its interest in taking on Instagram. Despite
the red flags raised by academics and experts, the operation was authorized
by U.S. authorities. Both acquisitions strengthened Facebook’s dominant
position in the online communication market. U.S. and EU authorities
decided that this merger was not creating conflicts of competence. In the
opinion of the Office of Fair Trading, “the parties’ revenue models are also
very different. While Facebook generates revenue from advertising and
users purchasing virtual and digital goods via Facebook, Instagram does not
generate any revenue.” 205
Facebook has an instant messaging application, Messenger, which
apparently did not compete with WhatsApp, another instant online
messaging app. WhatsApp’s business model was officially based on a paying
subscription—something that was vaguely enforced, and in fact, WhatsApp
was running in the red. 206 Instagram and WhatsApp investors were not
pursuing short-term profits. Their patient capital investors were waiting for
exponential growth, which would eventually result in market dominance. 207
WhatsApp could then experiment with different approaches to monetizing
the platform. 208 Another possibility is that WhatsApp was waiting to be
acquired by a large corporation in an adjacent business sector. In this case,
an acquisition would provide cash and shares of the purchaser. 209

Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, 8 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 257 (Oct.
15, 2016).
Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Platform Economy: Restructuring the Space of
Capitalist Accumulation, 13 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON. & SOC’Y 55, 57 (2020).
Commission Decision (EC) No. 139/2004 of Mar. 10, 2014, O.J. (C2014), available at
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_39621
32_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJC3-SLK9].
OFF. OF FAIR TRADING, ANTICIPATED ACQUISITION BY FACEBOOK INC. OF INSTAGRAM
INC.,
¶
23
(Aug.
14,
2012)
(UK),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/555de2e5ed915d7ae200003b/facebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VJK3-BM2A].
Kurt Wagner, Facebook Paid $19 Billion for WhatsApp, Which Lost $138 Million Last
Year, VOX (Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/10/28/11632404/facebook-paid-19billion-for-whatsapp-which-lost-138-million-last-year [https://perma.cc/55WF-7K4Z].
Mark Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2021).
See id. at 5, 45.
See id. at 6–7.
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This second scenario is what happened. 210 The U.S. and EU merger
authorization revealed blatant disinformation about the nature and scope of
the new digital corporation’s strategies. As the EU Commission
documented, these acquisitions, which the Authors of this Article purport
are illegal, served to establish monopolistic domination over the flow of data
in online communication. 211
Facebook is now under investigation in the United States for this same
reason. On October 22, 2019, New York State Attorney General Letitia
James announced that forty-seven attorneys general from states and U.S.
territories are investigating Facebook’s potential antitrust violations. 212 As will
later be demonstrated, the U.S. regulatory bodies governing competition in
commerce, the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal
Trade Commission, are undertaking their own investigations that extend to
other leading companies. 213 As with privacy, competition in commerce law
violation is a constant among big tech. Or in other words, a behavior
considered as a deviation is rather intrinsic to the digital capitalism business
model. No matter how large the fines are, corporations reoffend. What are
governments doing to tackle data crimes?
VI.

THE DATA PRIVACY AND COMPETITION APPROACH

To be fair, the EU and the U.S. are trying new ways to approach the
double-sided question of privacy and competition law violations. In 2016,
the competition authorities of France and Germany published a joint
document exploring the intimate relation of market power and data. 214
There, the Autorité de la Concurrence and the Bundeskartellamt stated
that:
Recent developments in digital markets have led to the
emergence of a number of firms that achieve extremely significant
turnovers based on business models which involve the collection
and commercial use of (often personal) data. Some of them enjoy
a very high share of users in the service sector in which they are
active. The Google search engine and the Facebook social
Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebookzuckerberg.html [https://perma.cc/Z835-VYP5].
See Commission Report, supra note 2, at 73.
Annie Palmer, 47 Attorneys General Are Investigating Facebook for Antitrust Violations,
CNBC (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/47-attorneys-general-areinvestigating-facebook-for-antitrust-violations.html [https://perma.cc/96GY-JLDS].
See infra Part IV.
See Bundeskartellamt, supra note 156.
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network are probably the most prominent examples. While many
of the services provided by these firms are marketed as ‘free’,
their use involves in practice making possible the collection of
personal information about the users. This has spurred new
discussions about the role of data in economic relationships as
well as in the application of competition law to such relationships,
in particular as regards the assessment of data as a factor to
establish market power. 215
Since then, what was a hypothesis has become EU’s official position
on the question of data/competition. For instance, in February 2019,
Giovanni Buttarelli, the European Data Protection Supervisor, published a
short paper titled “This is Not an Article on Data Protection and
Competition Law,” noting the importance of enhancing the cooperation
between competition and data watchdogs to protect markets and individual
rights. 216 As he stated, “[W]e are living in a time when we urgently need to
get back to the heart of privacy and competition laws to understand how
closely they are intertwined and how much they could support each other
in tackling some of biggest challenges of today’s world.” 217 Buttarelli’s paper
came after the decision of the German Antitrust Authority forbidding
Facebook from combining users’ data from different sources/platforms
under its control, such as WhatsApp or Instagram. 218 The German antitrust
authority pointed out how Facebook’s disdain for privacy rights or
competition rules reflects a deliberate strategy of pursuing domination:
Using and actually implementing Facebook’s data policy, which
allows Facebook to collect user and device-related data from
sources outside of Facebook and to merge it with data collected
on Facebook, constitutes an abuse of a dominant position on the
social network market in the form of exploitative business terms
pursuant to the general clause of Section 19(1) GWB . . . . As
Facebook is a dominant company users cannot protect their data
215

Id. at 3.

Giovanni Buttarelli, This is Not an Article on Data Protection and Competition Law,
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(Mar.
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2019),
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See Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary: Facebook, Exploitative Business Terms Pursuant
to Section 19(1) GWB for Inadequate Data Processing (Feb. 15, 2019),
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from being processed from a large number of sources, i.e. they
cannot decide autonomously on the disclosure of their data.
However, it must be ensured that the interests of the opposite
market side are sufficiently considered if a provider is a dominant
company which is not subject to sufficient competitive control. 219
In the same vein, the U.S. Congressional Research Service
published a surprisingly critical working paper, stating, “A number of
commentators have argued that the significant volume of user data
generated by certain digital platforms confers important advantages on
established companies . . . . Some commentators have accordingly
argued that access to ‘big data’ can resulting a feedback loop that
reinforces the dominance of large firms.” 220
In mid-2019, U.S. media reported that the FTC and the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”), both responsible for enforcing U.S. federal antitrust
laws, divided responsibility over inquiries into the monopolistic practices of
the ‘Big Four’ (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon). 221 As a result of
these investigations, the FTC reached a $5.5 billion settlement with
Facebook concerning privacy. 222 There is another FTC antitrust inquiry
pending. 223 The FTC complaint states that Facebook “subverted users’
privacy choices to serve its own business interests” through a series of
deceptive practices. 224 These practices include obtaining data without
permission, allowing non-authorized third parties (such as Cambridge
Analytica) to use Facebook users’ data, and failure to comply with previous
FTC orders. 225 The FTC acknowledged that previous fines and oversight
mechanisms had not been enough to deter Facebook. 226
Digital corporations are recalcitrant recidivists. That is why the
settlement is not only economic in nature, it also imposes a series of data
security obligations, and, what is more important in the opinion of the FTC
chairman, “a new corporate governance structure, with corporate and

219

Id. at 7–12. The Authors propose such disdain is criminal in nature. See id.

JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL45910, ANTITRUST AND “BIG TECH” 7 (2019).
Jason Del Rey, Why Congress’s Antitrust Investigation Should Make Big Tech Nervous,
VOX (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/6/21125026/big-tech-congressantitrust-investigation-amazon-apple-google-facebook [https://perma.cc/Y9D5-PPLJ].
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 193.
Complaint at 2, FTC. v. Facebook, Inc., CV 20-3590, 2021 WL 2643627 (D.D.C. Dec.
9, 2020).
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individual accountability and more rigorous compliance.” 227 More recently,
the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law of the
U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary launched a
series of hearings on “Online Platforms and Market Power.” 228 The sixth of
these hearings examined the dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Google. 229 There, the subcommittee members requested the testimony of
the mentioned companies’ CEOs (Jeff Bezos, Tim Cook, Mark Zuckerberg
and Sundar Pichai, respectively) about the monopolist and dominant
practices of their companies. 230 None of them apologized or showed any
regret for the proven misbehavior of their companies, nor did they accept
responsibility for their corporate crimes. 231 Instead, they drew a sweetened,
benevolent, and philanthropic version of digital capitalism built by self-made
entrepreneurs, the body and flesh of the new American Dream. 232
In their testimonies, they denied the accusation of monopolistic
behavior. For instance, Zuckerberg defended the acquisition of Instagram
and WhatsApp as beneficial not solely for Facebook’s own sake, but for
those companies, and society in general:
These benefits came about as a result of our acquisition of those
companies and would not have happened had we not made those
acquisitions. We have developed new products for Instagram and
WhatsApp, and we have learned from those companies to bring
new ideas to Facebook. The end result is better services that
provide more value to people and advertisers, which is a core goal
of Facebook’s acquisition strategy. 233
It is good to bear in mind the different judicial and political instances,
such as the German or the European, where those very same acquisitions

Statement of Chairman Joe Simons and Commissioners Noah Joshua Phillips and
Christine S. Wilson: In re Facebook, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 24, 2019),
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Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 6: Examining the Dominance of Amazon,
Apple, Facebook, and Google: Hearing on H.R. Res. 965 Before the Subcomm. on
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have been denounced as an example of monopolistic behavior. 234 The same
hypocritical tone was used in a statement by Pichai:
At Google, we take pride in the number of people who choose
our products and services; we’re even prouder of what they do
with them — whether it’s the 140 million students and educators
using G Suite for Education to stay connected during the
pandemic . . . the 5 million Americans gaining digital skills
through Grow with Google, part of our $1 billion initiative to
expand economic opportunity . . . or the millions of small
business owners connecting with customers through Google
products such as Maps and Search. 235
Pichai failed to mention that Google violated privacy and competition
rules with these same apps. 236
Multiple governmental and civil society organizations participated in
the subcommittee hearings as well. 237 The European Commission Executive
Vice-President, Margrethe Vestager (EU’s Commissioner for Competition),
addressed two statements to the subcommittee. 238 In these brief but densely
worded documents, Vestager outlines the EU’s stake on the interwoven
issue of data and competition, confirming and developing Bertarelli’s
arguments.
In Vestager’s first document, written while she was Commissioner for
Competition but not yet Executive Vice-President, she highlighted recent
litigation between Europe and Google, specifically the infamous Google
Shopping, 239 Android, 240 and Google AdSense 241 decisions regarding the
company’s abuse of its dominant position in the online shopping services:
In Google Shopping, we found that Google had abused its
dominant position as a search engine by treating its own
234
235

See supra notes 147–56 and associated text (outlining European position).
See Online Platforms, supra note 228, at 1 (statement of Sundar Pichai, Chief Executive
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comparison shopping service more favourably in its general
search results than rival comparison shopping services in terms of
placement and presentation . . . Then last year in Android, we
found that Google had abused its dominant position by the use
of certain contractual obligations and financial incentives aimed
at protecting and strengthening Google’s dominance in general
internet search. . . . In the most recent Google AdSense decision
. . . the Commission looked at hundreds of contracts and the
impact that their terms had on the market. Through an exclusivity
provision, the most commercially important customers were
contractually prevented from sourcing any search ads from
Google’s rivals on their websites. 242
Vestager’s second statement, focusing on how the EU was—and/or
would be—tackling corporate dominance, is organized in the form of three
pillars:
1. Continued vigorous competition law enforcement using our
existing case framework;
2. Possible ex ante regulation of digital platforms, including
additional requirements for those that have a gatekeeper role; and
3. A possible new competition tool to deal based on case-by-case
investigations with structural competition problems across
markets which cannot be tackled or addressed in the most
effective manner on the basis of the current competition rules. 243
Although coherent with the EU compromise with a regulated and
ordered free market, Vestager’s proposed measures do not offer a solution
to an ungovernable problem.
For its part, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission
(“ACCC”) launched, in 2017, an inquiry into digital platforms looking at the
impact that digital moguls had on the Australian media landscape, 244
especially on the ad revenues, which were the basis of the Australian media
business model. 245 Australian media organizations sustained that their
242
243
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Digital Platforms Inquiry, Project Overview, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER
COMM’N, https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/inquiries-finalised/digital-platforms-inquiry-0
[https://perma.cc/4K9R-9J5Z].
Jake Goldenfein, The Australian News Media Bargaining Code, PERISCOPE (June 2021),
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worrying diminishing benefits resulted from the tech firms’ advertising
dominance, achieved through the appropriation of the contents generated
by the media. 246 For the Australian media organizations, tech giants were
profiting from the contents that the media were producing without fairly
sharing the earnings. 247
In 2020, the Australian government entrusted the ACCC to draft a
bargaining code, an instrument that aimed to ensure fair distribution of
earnings through an arbitrated negotiation process between media content
producers and digital platforms. 248 Specifically, the law proposed that digital
platforms should pay when links to news are shared on social media. 249 The
draft was turned into a bill and sent to the Australian Parliament in
December 2020. 250 Google and Facebook, fiercely lobbying against the law,
threatened the Australian government to withdraw their services from their
territory. 251 While Google finally reached an agreement with Australian
media corporations, Facebook blocked Australian users from sharing links
on its platform, causing a major commotion. 252 The Australian government
finally surrendered to the mafia-like tactics used by Facebook, reaching an
agreement with the company in February 2021, which meant the bargaining
code had to be amended 253 As The Guardian reported:
The changes mean the government may not apply the code to
Facebook if the company can demonstrate it has signed enough
deals with media outlets to pay them for content. The
246
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Goldenfein, supra note 245.
Draft News Media Bargaining Code, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N,
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Ryan Browne, Australia to Force Google and Facebook to Pay News Publishers, CNBC
(July 31, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/31/australia-to-force-google-and-facebookto-pay-news-publishers.html [https://perma.cc/WE4P-XM73].
Google Threatens to Withdraw Search Engine from Australia, BBC (Jan. 22, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-55760673 [https://perma.cc/RLT9-YMY2].
Josh Taylor, Treasurer Says Facebook Has ‘Damaged Its Reputation’ with Australian
News Ban, GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2021/feb/18/facebook-to-restrict-australian-users-sharing-news-content
[https://perma.cc/EB6P-SC67].
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TIMES (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/16/business/media/news-corpfacebook-news.html [https://perma.cc/62SD-XJTV].
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government has also agreed that Facebook and other platforms
which would be subject to the code would be given a month’s
notice to comply. 254
The consequences of this negotiation process are unsettling. What
appeared to be a possibility of regulating digital platforms, ended with a
publicly safeguarded economic agreement between media and digital
corporations. Moreover, the media bargaining code recognizes and legalizes
Australia’s technological and infrastructural dependency on tech giants.
As we have seen, the problem of digital capitalism has less to do with
some deviant corporations than with a vast network of organized corporate
crime. In Silicon Valley, business equates to routinized corporate crime. As
Amnesty International stated in its “Letter for the Record” of the
aforementioned hearing on antitrust, “Legislators cannot allow Big Tech to
continue to abuse its colossal power over our everyday lives. Congress must
ensure that public digital space is reclaimed from a powerful and
unaccountable few and demand that it is accessible to all, with respect for
human rights at its core.” 255 Perhaps the notion of data crimes could help us
find ways of holding digital corporations accountable for their crimes. In
order to consider the viability of the above-proposed data crimes, we must
first consider the question of jurisdiction and enforceability. For this reason,
the last section will deal with the slippery matter of digital corporations’
international criminal liability.
VII.

TOWARD BIG TECH’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LIABILITY

Since the seminal work of Edwin Sutherland to the latest developments
in white-collar and corporate crimes, academic contributions have
consistently pointed out that corporations are far from being exemplary lawabiding citizens. 256 The issue is even more problematic in the tech industry.
The top five tech companies by revenue—Apple, Samsung, Foxconn,
Alphabet, and Microsoft 257—have been involved in serious crimes ranging
Amanda Meade, Josh Taylor & Daniel Hurst, Facebook Reverses Australia News Ban
After Government Makes Media Code Amendments, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2021),
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from tax evasion, corruption, labor exploitation, fraud, price-fixing, and
mismanagement or discrimination, of user data among others. 258 As we have
seen, U.S. authorities discovered and proved that Facebook sold and shared
private data with third parties without its users’ consent. In 2012, the FTC
approved a final settlement with Facebook, which, among other things,
required “Facebook to take several steps to make sure it lives up to its
promises in the future, including by giving consumers clear and prominent
notice and obtaining their express consent before sharing their information
beyond their privacy settings, by maintaining a comprehensive privacy
program to protect consumers’ information.” 259
In Google’s case, the EU Commission settled similar competition
provisions. As we know, it never worked. A plethora of case law involving
digital corporations proves that soft-law and self-regulatory solutions are not
enough to deal with digital corporate crime. The companies leading the
digital economy—Alphabet, Amazon, Uber, and Facebook—are alleged
criminals with many pending claims. 260 They are also well-known recidivists.
Even the largest fines—such as the ones imposed upon Google of over €8
billion 261 or the $5.5 billion Facebook agreed to pay in a single settlement 262—
have not caused a perceptible impact on those companies.
Although there is a growing academic and institutional concern with
the question of data, competition and corporate domination, this conduct is
still not being criminalized. Additionally, corporate criminal liability is still,
at best, at a minimum. It is an emergent trend, but poorly developed.
Punitive populism has a limit: the powerful. Corporate criminal liability is
very narrow. Unlike natural persons, criminal corporations can continue to
roam free after breaking the law. Their crimes, despite victimizing hundreds
See generally Rita Barrera & Jessica Bustamante, The Rotten Apple: Tax Avoidance in
Ireland, 32 INT’L TRADE J. 150 (2018); Jack Linchuan Qiu & Lin Lin, Foxconn: The
Disruption of iSlavery, 4 ASIASCAPE: DIGIT. ASIA 103 (2017).
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258
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of millions, are rarely considered as such. 263
As we have seen, different investigations proved that user data from
Facebook of at least 87 million people was exposed, traded, and processed
by Cambridge Analytica, a data analysis company that at the time was
working for the Trump and Brexit campaigns, among others. And
remember that the European Charter of Human Rights, further developed
through other EU instruments, such as the GDPR, protect data as a
fundamental right. Hence, Facebook violated the fundamental rights of
hundreds of millions of victims. If there is a place for the ultima ratio legis
to be in action, it should be for those powerful subjects causing serious social
harm and victimizing millions. Making corporations criminally liable for
data crimes may deter corporation from further offenses. The Authors are
conscious that this entails multiple legal doctrinal and jurisdictional
challenges.
Many scholars, such as Grietje Baars, 264 Laureen Snider, 265 Steve
Tombs, and David Whyte 266 have pointed out the challenges of corporate
criminal liability (or, rather, the absence of liability). As Tombs and Whyte
remind, the question of corporate impunity is not just a matter of criminal
policies. 267 “[T]he corporate form and the state are thus inextricably linked
to the extent that, in contemporary capitalism, each is a condition of
existence of the other.” 268 This intimate relation between corporations and
the institutions that should be regulating them has helped to hide corporate
criminal activity behind a curtain of impunity. Corporations are criminal by
design as long as “the corporation was constructed as a ‘structure of
irresponsibility’– precisely to ensure ‘corporate impunity’ (and the impunity
of the individuals behind the corporation). The corporation became ‘capital
personified,’ an amoral calculator, driven by the profit imperative, or the
imperialism at the heart of the corporation.” 269 The structure of corporate
impunity is even more perceptible at an international level. Early colonialist
corporations were often entrusted by nation states with the exploitation of
entire territories and their populations (often in the Global South) with the
connivance, if not the applause, of the international community, which was
limited to a handful of Global North countries. 270
Daniel Solove & Danielle Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96
TEX. L. REV. 737, 745 (2017).
See e.g., BAARS, supra note 62, at 51.
See, e.g., Snider, supra note 7, at 563.
See, e.g., TOMBS & WHYTE, supra note 69.
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The intertwined history of capitalism and colonialism instrumentalized
through corporations endures till today. For instance, as Jenny Chan and
others 271 have denounced, the collusion between two giants, U.S.’s Apple
and Taiwanese Foxconn (iPhone’s leading manufacturer), has resulted in
tremendous benefits for Apple, huge benefits for Foxconn, and poverty,
suicide, and despair for the Chinese workers actually producing the product:
In 2010, Apple demonstrated its corporate prowess by capturing
an extraordinary 58.5 percent of the sales price of the iPhone, a
virtually unparalleled achievement in world manufacturing . . . .
Particularly notable is that labor costs in China accounted for the
smallest share of the “made in China” iPhone, a mere 1.8 percent
or nearly US$10 of the US$549 retail price of the iPhone 4.
American, Japanese, and South Korean firms that produced the
most sophisticated electronics components, such as the
touchscreen display, memory chips, and microprocessors,
captured slightly over 14 percent of the value of the iPhone. The
cost of raw materials was just over one-fifth of the total value (21.9
percent). In short, while Foxconn carved out a niche as the
exclusive final assembler of the iPhone, the lion’s share of the
profits was captured by Apple. In this international division of
labor, Foxconn captured only a small portion of the value while
its workers in electronics processing and assembly received a
pittance. 272
It is no coincidence that super-powerful corporations shielded in their
Global North fortresses have bypassed, broken, tricked, or simply ignored
national and international laws to steal data. As Baars reminds us,
imperialism lies at the heart of the corporate form. 273 After all, the first global
capitalist companies were incorporated under the protection of the English
(later British) Crown to govern, dominate, and exploit entire nations. The
imperialist international structure of impunity mentioned by Baars is a
fundamental element of digital capitalism’s data extractivist endeavor, for
hegemonic digital corporations are often based in Global North countries,
overwhelmingly in the U.S., while their victims are usually based overseas,
commonly in Global South countries. Hence, although it extensively affects
citizens in the Global North countries, data crimes are by their nature and
structure, part of an imperialist phenomenon defined by Nick Couldry and
271
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Ulíses Mejias as data colonialism:
Data colonialism is, in essence, an emerging order for the
appropriation of human life so that data can be continuously
extracted from it for profit. This extraction is operationalized via
data relations, ways of interacting with each other and with the
world facilitated by digital tools. The rough data relations, human
life is not only annexed to capitalism but also becomes subject to
continuous monitoring and surveillance. The result is to
undermine the autonomy of human life in a fundamental way that
threatens the very basis of freedom, which is exactly the value that
advocates of capitalism extol. 274
Thus, criminalizing data crimes at a domestic level would not be
enough to put an end to the digital corporate crime. After all, Silicon
Valley’s champions, such as Facebook or Google, are shielded in Global
North countries, such as the U.S., while most of their billions of users are
spread in the Global South. Consequently, criminalizing data crimes would
not only entail challenging the capitalist legal structure of nation states but
would also involve dismantling the colonial structure of impunity in which
criminal corporations operate.
There are several obstacles that should be considered before any
realistic criminalization of data crimes is attempted. The current legal
framework and enforcement agencies are not sufficiently fit or adapted to
deal with a new era of big-tech, criminal corporations. As stated in this
Article, despite some spectacular institutional moves against big tech, with
some of the largest fines ever imposed, digital corporations still reoffend. As
Zuckerberg once suggested, digital corporations inherently “move fast and
break things,” 275 and they do so with impunity. And perhaps, what is more
important to consider and further explore, is that big tech criminals are
victimizing on a global scale, affecting hundreds of millions of persons and
institutions across multiple jurisdictions. It is clear that the current legal
framework and existing forms of enforcement used to tackle data crimes are
not working, yet we still lack a viable alternative.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

This Article examined a key element of the silicon doctrine’s wider
COULDRY & MEJIAS, supra note 24, at xiii.
JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK, GOOGLE, AND
AMAZON HAVE CORNERED CULTURE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US 8 (2017).
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strategy. Drawing on Orla Lynskey’s concept of data power, the Authors of
this Article advanced the notion of data crimes—that is a two-sided corporate
crime that involves both massive exploitation of users’ data, and the
breaching of competition laws, with an aim of seizing a socially harmful
market dominant position. Drawing upon the works of critical
criminologists such as Sutherland, Pearce, and Whyte, among others, this
Article outlined key elements of the literature analyzing corporate and
white-collar crime. With this, the Authors aimed to explain why certain
specific behaviors committed by “the powerful” are often not criminalized,
and moreover, have become essential to the operation of the capitalist
system of exploitation.
Many of the data crimes’ evils can be traced back to the neoliberal
revolution. In this regard, to provide an adequate historical framework for
the spectacular rise of digital capitalism’s criminal activity, this Article
analyzed the unsettling Global North’s switch from a progressive legal
framework that tackled corporate power, into another that finally unleashed
neoliberal monopolistic forces.
In the second part of the Article, the Authors delved into the two sides
of data crimes: privacy and competition law violation. For that, this Article
examined how one of Silicon Valley’s leading companies, Facebook,
exploited and abused user data as well as violating competition rules to
dominate the social media market. In Part V, the Authors reconsidered the
question of corporate criminality in light of the crimes of digital capitalism.
This has flagged important questions around the theoretical and practical
challenges of making digital capitalists accountable, especially given the
colonial structure of irresponsibility in which the corporate form resides.
In brief recapitulation of the features that define data crimes: (1) Data
crimes are a form of state-corporate crime that is rapidly transitioning to a
form of corporate organized crime. (2) Data crimes do not respond to a
single criminal activity. Instead, they are a form of corporate criminality
composed by a plurality of offenses, including breaking competence or
privacy laws, aiming to achieve corporate dominance or data power. (3)
Data crimes are not cybercrime. This corporate criminogenic behavior
happens in and outside the network, which, in any case, is not a digital space
apart from the material reality, but a digitalized extension of it. (4) Data
crimes are not property rights. They are serious offenses, causing
tremendous social harm. According to today’s westernized legal
cosmovision, data rights are intrinsic to human dignity, and hence a violation
of data privacy should be considered and treated as a human rights violation.
(5) Data crimes are a form of organized corporate criminality threatening
citizens’ rights and democratic values.
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